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ment by a multiplicity of individual suits, this might well be achieved by the
damage requirement; few, if any, individual plaintiffs could show damage,
while a proper class could be presumed to have sustained damage.
In any event, the damage requirement will not be abandoned completely
in the unlicensed practice field. As long as courts confine to competitors the
right to enjoin unlicensed practice, some sort of damage requirement is
operating; competitors are more likely to have suffered damage than other
plaintiffs. But, if plaintiffs are regarded as public protectors only, the rationale
for a limitation to competitors of the right to enjoin is unclear. If individual
suits are to be allowed, there would seem to be no reason why individual
non-competitor plaintiffs could not protect the public as well as competitors.
However, to allow non-competitors to sue would 'require complete abandon-
ment of the damage requirement-a step which courts may well be unwilling
to take. Nor would it seem necessary to take this step in order to achieve
adequate public protection; the motivation for a non-competitor to sue will
seldom arise.
STATE STATUTES: CONSTITUTIONAL SUBJECT-TITLE AND
AMENDATORY REQUIREMENTS
No act hereafter passed shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be
expressed in the title.., and no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its
title only, but the law revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length
in the new act.1
This and similar constitutional provisions have been used with increasing
frequency but with diminishing success in attacking the validity of legislation.
Since, as Justice Frankfurter has remarked, "today cases not resting on
statutes are reduced almost to zero," 2 such provisions are important tools for
the lawyer who must deal with legislation. This comment will survey the
Illinois decisions in order to appraise the likelihood of successfully attacking
statutes by means of such a constitutional provision.
I. SUBJECT-TITLE PROVISION
The adoption of a constitutional requirement limiting each act to a single
"subject" which must be described in the title resulted from dissatisfaction
with the early English and American practice of enacting statutes without
titles.3 The generally expressed purposes of such a provision are several:
'II1. Const. Art. IV, §13. Similar provisions appear in the constitutions of other states.
E.g., Cal. Const. Art. IV, §24; Ind. Const. Art. 4, §19; Fla. Const. Art. III, §16; Md.
Const. Art. III, §29.
2 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527 (1947).
The titles to early statutes were supplied by a clerk after enactment, indicating his
understanding rather than that of the legislature. Where titles were supplied by the
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to prevent legislative "log-rolling"; 4 to prevent surprise on the legislature by
crafty insertion of provisions, not related to the title, which might not be
enacted if the provisions were properly indicated by the titles; and to notify
the public, through accurate labeling of the proposed legislation, so that they
may be heard thereon. 5
Accuracy of Title. With the growing volume of legislation at each session,
and the pressure tactics of lobbyists which often meet little or no opposition,
the legislator is clearly dependent upon accurate labeling of statutory con-
tents. And the interested layman who is presumed to know the law should
be given every reasonable opportunity to know that the statute exists. On the
other hand, the courts ought not and will not allow such procedural require-
ments to frustrate legitimate and beneficial legislation merely because a better
title might have been used.6 Formulation of the test to be used has been
difficult, and its application has led to questionable results.
A fair test has been to inquire whether a reasonable reader or an "ordinary
person of intelligence" would be misled as to the general purport of the stat-
ute.7 If a layman would not be misled, it is unlikely that a legislator, lawyer,
or other experienced person could be confused. Occasionally, however, in de-
termining whether a questioned provision is within the subject expressed in the
title, the court has enunciated a second test. If the provision is such that "if
traced back [it] will lead the mind to the subject as the generic head," the
constitutional requirement is met.8 This second test, which in effect requires
a reading of the provision in question, would appear to place such a burden
on the reader as to defeat the protection intended by the constitution.
In any event, recent decisions have clearly adopted a liberal attitude in
favor of upholding statutes attacked on the ground of inaccuracy of title. The
typical statement is:
legislature, they were generally affixed after enactment and with little attention from
the members. I Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 291-2 (8th ed., 1927); Sutherland,
Statutory Construction §1701 (3d ed., 1943).
'This has been defined as "[t]he practice of bringing together into one bill subjects
diverse in their nature, and having no necessary connection, with a view to combine in
their favor the advocates of all, and thus secure the passage of several measures, no one
of which could succeed upon its own merits." People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 481, 494
(1865). It has been commented that log-rolling is still possible though perhaps more
difficult. Manson, The Drafting of Statute Titles, 10 Ind. L. J. 155, 156 (1934).
5E.g., see People v. Gebbie, 5 Ill. 2d 565, 126 N.E.2d 657 (1955); People v. Mahumed,
381 Ill. 81, 44 N.E.2d 911 (1942); Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N.E. 713
(1915).
8See Baim v. Fleck, 406 Ill. 193, 92 N.E.2d 770 (1950).
7 See, e.g., People v. Levin, 412 Ill. 11, 104 N.E.2d 814 (1952) (holding a penal provision
in a Uniform Trust Receipts Act is not logically to be expected in a non-regulatory act) ;
People v. Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 44 N.E.2d 911 (1942) (an "ordinary person of intelligence"
would not conceive the presence of the penalty in the "heart-balm" act).
S E.g., Pickus v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 9 Ill.2d 599, 611, 138
N.E.2d 532, 539 (1956) ; Lasdon v. Hallihan, 377 Ill. 187, 196, 36 N.E.2d 227, 232 (1941).
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In construing the constitutional requirement of a singleness of subject, the tend-
ency has been to adopt a liberal, rather than a strict, construction. To render a pro-
vision in the body of a statute void because it is not embraced in its title, the pro-
vision must be one which is incongruous or which has no proper connection with the
title of the act.9
Although in Illinois, as in most other states, there is a presumption in favor
of the validity of a statute,' 0 the subject-title provision is mandatory on the
courts." In practice, however, there appears to be so much room for subjective
"interpretation" that it is difficult, if not impossible, to predict with certainty
the success with which a particular statute might be attacked.
Unity of Subject. If it can be successfully demonstrated that either the title
or body of the act contains more than one subject, the consequences are fairly
clear. Plurality of subject in the title alone is not fatal to the statute since the
constitutional restriction only requires unity of subject in the body of the
act.12 But if the body contains two subjects and only one is expressed in the
title, the part not contained in the title is void.' 3 And where both the act and
title embrace two subjects, the entire act must fall since the court, it is said,
cannot elect one subject over the other.' 4 The result in the latter situation
seems undesirable; if the title clearly indicates the contents of the act, it is
unlikely that the mere presence of two subjects would mislead the legislature
or the public. It would seem that this result could be avoided, as is done in
some states, by ascertaining the major or "primary" subject.15
While the courts have long asserted various verbal formulae for determining
the "subject" of an act, the recent tendency has been toward a more liberal
'E.g., People ex rel. Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9 Il.2d 539, 549, 138 N.E.2d 471, 477 (1956);
People ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie, 5 IUl.2d 565, 126 N.E.2d 657 (1955).
"
0 See, e.g., Campe v. Cermak, 330 Il1. 463, 161 N.E. 761 (1928)("plain meaning");
Michaels v. Hill, 328 Ill. 11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927) ("Presumption of validity"); People v.
McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N.E. 865 (1908). Consult Sutherland, op. cit. supra, note 1, at
§1706. Compare Cloyd v. County of Vermillion, 360 Ill. 610, 196 N.E. 802 (1935) ("Any
reasonable meaning even if not common").
"See Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 39, 109 N.E. 713, 718 (1915) (" '[tihe
court cannot permit such [constitutional] provisions to be . . . overridden in the enact-
ment of legislation'"). A few states have taken the position that such provisions must be
merely directory since otherwise most existing legislation would be void. Consult Suther-
land, op. cit. supra, note 3, at §1703; Cooley, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 311-2.
'People v. Solomon, 265 Ill. 28, 106 N.E. 458 (1914); People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146,
84 N.E. 865 (1908).
"See cases cited note 14 infra.
"'E.g., Campe v. Cermak, 330 Ill. 463, 161 N.E. 761 (1928); Michaels v. Hill, 328 InI.
11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927); Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 Ill. 634, 120 N.E.
562 (1918).
"E.g., State v. Lancaster County, 17 Neb. 85, 22 N.W. 228 (1885); Reilly v. Knapp,
105 Kan. 565, 185 Pac. 47 (1919).
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finding of a single subject.1 6 The "subject" may be as broad and comprehen-
sive as the legislature chooses and may include all matter "germane" thereto
including the provisions reasonably necessary to accomplish the legislative
purpose. Only unrelated or "discordant" provisions are prohibited.17 Concrete
examples, however, will best illustrate the changing attitude of the courts.
In 1918, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the power of a municipality to
sell surplus electricity was a "subject" separate from the power to regulate
rates for electricity furnished by a public utility. Though both powers were
related to the general power of a municipality, the former was deemed propri-
etory and the latter legislative.' 8 The power of a county to construct a county
building was in 1928 held a subject separate from the power of the county to
contract with a municipality for the location of such a building on municipally-
owned property. The crucial difference was found in the fact that a county is
an involuntary sub-division of the state while a municipality is a voluntary
one.
19
The modern decisions present a striking contrast. In Pickus v. Board of Edu-
cation of City of Chicago,20 decided in 1956, the Illinois court held that an act
entitled "An Act in relation to State Finance" could validly contain a provi-
sion withholding compensation from state employees who refused to sign non-
Communist loyalty oaths. Since the provision prescribes a condition precedent
to the receipt of state funds, it was held to deal with that subject. The result in
Pickus was justified by use of the second test described above. In 1955 the
budgetary power of a sanitary district's Board of Trustees was considered to
be inseparable from the subject of the power concerning appropriation and
levy of taxes by the Board. Only the latter power was expressed in the title of
the amending act.21 In a 1953 decision, the public acquisition of vacant lands
for development of housing facilities, not limited to low rentals, was held to be
"6 E.g., People ex rel. Coutrakon v. Lohr, 9 Ell.2d 539, 138 N.E.2d 471 (1956) ; People
ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie, 5 Ill.2d 565, 587, 126 N.E.2d 657, 668 (1955) ("the tendency
has been to adopt a liberal rather than a strict construction, to the end that the beneficial
purpose for which the provision was adopted will not be defeated").
1? E.g., authorities cited note 16, supra. See also, e.g., People v. City of Chicago, 414 Iln.
600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953) (wherein the legislature's definition in the questioned act
itself was determinative).
"Sutter v. People's Gas Light & Coke Co., 284 U1. 634, 120 N.E. 562 (1918).
19 Campe v. Cermak, 330 Ill. 463, 161 N.E. 761 (1928). See also Michaels v. Hill, 328
Ill. 11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927) (holding the power of municipalities to incur debt a different
subject from the executions and levy of county taxes).
-9 Ill. 2d 599, 138 N.E.2d 532 (1956).
'People ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie, 5 l.2d 565, 126 N.E.2d 657 (1955) (act entitled
"An Act to validate certain appropriation ordinances and certain tax levy ordinances here-
tofore adopted by the Board of Trustees of any sanitary district organized and existing
under 'An Act to create sanitary districts to remove obstructions in the Des Plains and
Illinois Rivers,' approved.. ").
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encompassed by the subject of slum clearance.22 The most striking aspect of
these decisions is the heavy reliance by the courts upon the legislature's deter-
mination that the questioned powers were in reality single subjects. In the
sanitary district case, the court relied upon the definition of "budget" in the
original act as including appropriations and taxes. In the 1953 housing case
the court was greatly influenced by the detailed statement, found in the ques-
tioned statute itself and in a similar federal housing act, of the required inter-
relation between vacant land and congested slum areas. While this liberal
tendency is perhaps to be desired, the legislature's determination of what is
"germane" should not be substituted for the court's own judgment of what
may mislead a reasonable reader.
Scope of Title. Unity of subject alone is not sufficient to shelter a statute
from an attack for non-compliance with the constitutional provision.2 3 The
objectives underlying the unity-of-subject provision require as a corollary a
proper relation between a statute and its title.24 While the title may be framed
in general terms and need not be an index of the provisions of the statute,25 it
cannot be so broad as to give no clue to its content.26 Perhaps the most help-
ful generalization is that the title must "fairly apprise the legislators and pub-
lic in general of the subject matter of the legislation so as to reasonably lead
to an inquiry into the body of the bill." 27 The title is to be read through the
eyes of "an ordinary person of intelligence."-28 It is the official title which the
bill carried through both houses with which the courts are concerned. Decep-
tiveness of an editorial heading added by a publisher for the "convenience" of
its customers cannot be blamed upon the legislature.29
The most frequently litigated question is whether the title of an act suffi-
'People v. City of Chicago, 414 I1. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953) (new act entitled "An
Act in relation to the eradication and redevelopment of slum and blighted areas and for
the development and redevelopment of blighted vacant areas. . . ."). Note the dissenting
opinion at 624, 640 wherein Chief justice Crompton stated, "[ehxcept for appropriate rede-
velopment of sites formerly occupied by the cleared slums, a matter not involved here, the
construction elsewhere of residences beyond the means of the persons displaced can have no
appreciable effect in alleviating [the evils of congested slum areas]."
'See Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 299, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1946), where the court
indicates that "even though the purpose of the act be single, if that purpose is not ex-
pressed in the title, the act [provision?] is void."
See, e.g., People v. Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 44 N.E.2d 911 (1942) ; and cases cited note 5,
supra.
'See, e.g., People v. City of Chicago, 414 BI. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953); People v.
Kelley, 357 ll. 408, 192 N.E. 372 (1934).
' Allardt v. People, 197 Ill. 501, 64 N.E. 536 (1902) (title held too general). See Rouse v.
Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 81 N.E. 1109 (1907).
'Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 299, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (1946).
People v. Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 84, 44 N.E.2d 911, 912 (1942) ; Rouse v. Thompson,
228 Ill. 522, 81 N.E. 1109 (1907).
2 People v. Edge, 406 Ill. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950).
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ciently indicates the presence of a criminal penalty for its violation. Where the
act by its title is "in relation to criminal jurisprudence," an attack on this
ground is not likely to succeed. This phrase has been said to cover "all . . .
imaginable offenses against the public law"; 30 it has been held to include such
diverse situations as the authorization of civil suits to recover penal damages,3 '
the prohibition of advocacy of violent overthrow of government, 32 and the im-
position of special penalties on habitual offenders. 33
Even in statutes not purporting to create criminal offenses, criminal penal-
ties are usually held to be sufficiently indicated by titles which state that the
act shall "protect" or "regulate" a specific occupation or activity. This is the
case, for example, with the "protection" of union labels 3 4 and bank de-
positors,36 and with the "regulation" of the admission of foreign corpora-
tions.36 Such statutes are considered "penal in nature" since no effective pro-
tection or regulation could be obtained without criminal sanctions. However,
in Italia America Shipping Corp. v. Nelson,37 even though the title did not
contain the words "protect" or "regulate," the penalty provision was upheld-
a "perusal" of the act showed its regulatory nature. A "reasonable" reader
might expect such a provision if the title clearly indicated a regulatory act,
but a requirement that one read the act to see if it is regulatory comes danger-
ously close to a denial of the need for any title at all. Of course, if the title
clearly expresses the presence of a penalty, there is no attack open unless it be
that of plurality of subject.38
Although it is often stated that no particular form or terms are required for
a valid title,39 the use of such words as "concerning" or "in relation to" would
not seem to indicate the presence of a criminal penalty. An exception might be
made in such cases as Italia America Shipping, where the defendant, a bank-
er, could more reasonably have been expected to understand the need for
*'See Rouse v. Thompson, 228 Ill. 522, 533, 81 N.E. 1109, 1112 (1907). The court there
continues, ". . . and also all proper provisions for the prevention of crimes, .... conviction,
and punishment of all classes of offenders, and for fixing the jurisdiction ... of the various
courts ... and prescribing the mode of procedure and the rules of evidence applicable to
criminal trials."
3
'Larned v. Tiernan, 110 Il. 173 (1884).
' People v. Lloyd, 304 IM. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922).
'People v. Kukoch, 7 Ill. 2d 255, 130 N.E.2d 505 (1955); People v. Cohen, 366 Il.
190, 8 N.E.2d 184 (1937).
*' Cohn v. The People, 149 Ill. 486, 37 N.E. 60 (1894).
People v. Colegrove, 354 Ill. 164, 187 N.E. 913 (1933).
Guest Piano Co. v. Picker, 274 Ill. 448, 113 N.E. 717 (1916).
- 323 Il. 427, 154 N.E. 198 (1926) (act "in relation to" dealing in foreign exchange).
I Stewart v. Brady, 300 Ill. 425, 133 N.E. 310 (1921) (title: An act relating to the sale
of . . . securities and providing penalties for the violation thereof . ..
"Heck v. Schupp, 394 M11. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946).
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criminal sanctions; but even this is questionable since the degree of sophistica-
tion reasonably to be expected in each case is far from clear. Hence, a penalty
provision could not be slipped into a uniform act "concerning" trust receipts
which was considered merely to define and not to regulate the business usage
of such instruments.40 Similarly, "an act in relation to certain causes or action
conducive to extortion and blackmail... " could not validly contain a penalty
for identifying, without court approval, the co-respondent in suits for divorce
of separate maintenance.41
Even where the title of an act specifically deals with criminal behavior, it
h?,s occasionally been held that if a new crime is created, this fact of newness
must be expressed in the title. For example, in Milne v. People,42 it was held
that an act "for the punishment of crimes against children" was invalid inso-
far as it created an entirely new crime. The court remarked, however, that if
the title had included the words "to define and punish" it would have been
sufficient. This "new crime" theory, however, is not successful where a de-
fendant, such as a banker, may be expected to know the law.48 But an act
relating to banks could not make it a misdemeanor for concerns which do not
traditionally perform savings functions to deal in foreign exchange.44
Other statutory schemes are also susceptible to similar attack. For example,
where the statute attempts to abolish a civil action,45 or source of compensa-
tion for public officers,46 or to create a new civil action,47 the courts tend to
scrutinize the title carefully. Also, a change of political territorial units re-
quires clear notice to the inhabitants via the title.
48
'5People v. Levin, 412 I. 11, 104 N.E.2d 814 (1952) (Title: "An Act concerning trust
receipts ... and to make uniform the laws relating thereto").
'
1People v. Mahumed, 381 Ill. 81, 44 N.E.2d 911 (1942).
-2224 l. 125, 128, 79 N.E. 631, 632 (1906); In re Snyder, 108 Mich. 48, 65 N.W. 562
(1895) (similar child molester statute invalid).
'Italia American Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 323 Il. 427, 154 N.E. 198 (1926); People v.
Colegrove, 354 111. 164, 187 N.E. 913 (1933).
"'Wedesweiler v. Brundage, 297 I1. 228, 130 N.E. 520 (1921).
'Heck v. Schupp, 394 Ill. 296, 68 N.E.2d 464 (1946) ("An Act in relation to certain
causes of action conducive to extortion.. ." could not abolish civil action for alienation
of affection, breach of contract to marry, etc.) ; People ex rel. Clarke v. Jarecki, 363 Inl.
180, 1 N.E.2d 855 (1936) (Act "in relation to the payment of [delinquent real estate
taxes]" held invalid because the title did not sufficiently indicate the waiver of accumulated
interest, forfeitures and rentals).
"' Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N.E. 713 (1915) ("An Act providing for the
payment by the County of Cook of further compensation.... ." did not indicate that prior
source was abolished).
See Hollingsworth v. Chicago Coal Co., 243 Ill. 98, 90 N.E. 276 (1909).
"Donnersberger v. Prendergast, 128 111. 229, 21 N.E. 1 (1889) (extension of boundaries
of incorporated cities).
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COMMENTS
I. AMENDATORY STATUTES
Statutes which amend or revise existing legislation, expressly or by implica-
tion, are subject to additional assault-both with respect to the subject-title
requirement and the further provision of Section 13 of Article IV:
[N]o law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only, but the law
revived, or the section amended, shall be inserted at length in the new act.49
Historically this provision was designed to remedy the evil of "blind" legisla-
tion which resulted, sometimes intentionally, in confusion. The early acts often
simply referred to the amended section and stated the words to be substituted
or modified so that the amending act by itself would be meaningless.50 Hence,
the underlying purpose of the requirement is to avoid the necessity of having
to refer to the prior law to find the meaning of the amendatory act.51 Thus, it
has been held that only the new section as amended need be printed. It is not
necessary to reiterate in the new act the existing amended provisions of the old
law still in force or to reprint all prior acts in any way modified by the new
act.52 On the other hand where an existing section "is hereby amended by add-
ing thereto section X to read as follows.. ." the existing section affected as
well as the new section X must be published.53 It would seem, however, that
amendments consisting of single words or small phrases could readily be in-
serted in the newly amended section in such a way that the true import of the
amendment might not be noticed. Printing the new material in some distinctive
manner such as bold-face type or italics, would seem to be a desirable addition-
al safeguard. 54
Despite the seeming simplicity of the constitutional provision, there has
been dispute concerning the determination of which statutes must comply with
the provisions.
A confusing area-and hence a promising one for attacking statutes-is
where the act does not expressly purport to amend any existing statute, but
nevertheless has that effect. Where the new act is clearly complete in itself, no
other act need be referred to on that particular aspect of the subject. The con-
" Consult note 1, supra.
'
0See Lombardo Wine Co. v. Taylor, 407 Ill. 454, 95 N.E.2d 607 (1950) ; People v. Knoff,
183 Ill. 410, 56 N.E. 155 (1900). I Cooley, op. cit. supra, note 3 at 314.
MSee Co-ordinated Transport v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321, 106 N.E.2d 510 (1952) ; People v.
City of Peoria, 374 Ill. 313, 29 N.E.2d 539 (1940).
'E.g., People v. Gaylord Bldg. Corp., 369 Ill. 371, 16 N.E.2d 901 (1938); Crocher v.
Abel, 348 Il. 269, 180 N.E. 852 (1932) ; Cooley, op. cit. supra, note 3.
'E.g., Galpin v. City of Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N.E. 713 (1915) (changing source of
compensation of state's attorney from fines to salary) ; Lyons v. Police Pension Board, 255
Ill. 139, 99 N.E. 337 (1912).
' I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 347 (3d ed., 1943).
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stitutional provision is therefore inapplicable even though existing legislation
may be amended by implication.55 The undesirability of republishing all
affected legislation is patent.5 6
Whether a statute is "complete in itself" depends upon the substance of the
act rather than the form of its title. If, upon a comparison between the ques-
tioned act and existing statutes, it appears that the new law has merely "inter-
mingled" new provisions with the old so that both acts must be consulted to
determine the law on that "branch" of the subject matter, the act must fall.57
It is also not unlikely that the courts' attitude toward the substantive
policy of an "original" act may influence its judgment. For example, a police
pensions act was held not "complete in itself" since it failed to require actual
services or provide for non-active duty.58 Similarly, in two recent liquor-con-
trol cases the acts in question were struck down as improper attempts at in-
direct amendment inasmuch as they contained no provisions for procedural
safeguards in the liquor commission hearings. 59
A contrast is provided by the recent decision in the Pickus case upholding a
non-Communist loyalty affidavit provision in an act "in relation to state
finance." 60 The court rejected the argument that this was an incomplete
amendment of statutes relating to civil service employment and school teach-
ers' tenure, and was therefore void for failure to reprint the amended acts. The
court deemed the provisions complete in themselves and went on to state that
the constitutional provision applies only when the law is expressly amendatory
or clearly so by its exhaustiveness. This position is now taken in many states.6'
Limiting the republication provision to expressly amendatory statutes, how-
ever, would appear to lead to an anomalous result. By intentional failure to
E.g., Starck v. Chicago & Northwestern R. Co., 4 Ill. 2d 616, 123 N.E.2d 826 (1954)
(act "in relation to Municipal Courts . . ." was complete as to selection of juries despite
jury commissioner's Act); People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago Regional Port District,
4 Ill.2d 363, 123 N.E.2d 92 (1954) (an act "To create a [Chicago Reg. Port. Dist.] ... and
to define its duties" complete and valid despite incidental amendment).
See Timm v. Harrison, 109 Ill. 593 (1884) ; and the famous case of People v. Mahaney,
13 Mich. 481 (1865).
1 DeMotte v. DeMotte, 364 Ill. 421, 4 N.E.2d 960 (1936) (separate maintenance statute
could not modify desertion as ground for divorce) ; Chicago Motor Club v. Kinney, 329
Ill. 120, 160 N.E. 163 (1928) (use of "road" funds); Board of Education v. Haworth,
274 Ill. 538, 113 N.E. 939 (1916) (use of state school funds).
E.g., Wagner v. Retirement Board, 370 fl1. 73, 17 N.E.2d 972 (1938) ; see Demotte v.
Demotte, 364 Ill. 421, 4 N.E.2d 960 (1936).
"Lombardo Wine Co. v. Taylor, 407 Ill. 454, 95 N.E.2d 607 (1950) (Price Posting Act
held improper attempt to extend powers of Illinois Liquor Control Commission); Illinois
Liquor Commission v. Chicago's Last Liquor Store, 403 Ill. 578, 88 N.E.2d 15 (1949)
(Mandatory Fair Trade Act held similarly an improper amendment of Liquor Control Act).
Consult text discussion at p. 725, supra.
"I Sutherland, Statutory Construction §1917 (3d ed., Horack, 1942) ; cases cited in 5
A.L.R.2d 1270 (1949).
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warn the reader of the amendatory nature of an act, the legislature could safe-
ly disregard the constitutional safeguard and rely upon the "completeness" of
the specific provision in question. As evidenced by the Pickus case, this would
throw the entire burden of protection upon the subject-title provision which is
currently being undermined by liberal "interpretation. '62 It has been sug-
gested, on the other hand, that this position should be adopted generally.6 3
The increased use of revised statutes, up to date private compilations and
annotated statutes, as well as the declining possibility of "blind" amendment,
facilitate intelligent interpretation of statutes and reduce the justification for
the constitutional requirement of republication.
It is possible validly to incorporate a provision of one act into another by
an unambiguous reference to the adopted provision. Where one act clearly
refers to a specific provision of another it is held that the provision so incorpo-
rated by reference has been validly written into the adopting act even though
both acts must be examined.64 But the reference must be unambiguous. 65 For
example, reference to another act for a definition where the adopted section
does not contain the term to be defined is invalid to the extent that the adopt-
ing act is ambiguous.6
It is often stated that where the title of an expressly amendatory act re-
peats the title of the amended statute, any additional provision which might
validly have been inserted in the latter may be included in the amending
statute.67 In attempting to increase the scope of existing acts, however,
amendatory statutes are likely fatally to include more than one subject in the
body and title.0 8 But as has been observed in cases involving local tax author-
ity 9 and slum clearance cases,70 the modern tendency is for the court to be
' Consult text discussion at pp. 725-26, supra.
'I Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 3 at §1918.
" E.g., People v. Lewis, 5 Ill.2d 117, 125 N.E.2d 87 (1955) (act revising interest penalty
payable on redemption validly incorporated procedure by words "shall be computed in the
same manner as is provided in §253"). See People v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 539, 121
N.E.2d 791 (1954).
' E.g., People v. Thompson, 381 lI. 48, 44 N.E.2d 899 (1942) ("in like manner and with
like notice as in County Election" held not sufficiently precise reference).
'People ex rel. Schoon v. Carpentier, 2 Ill.2d 468, 118 N.E.2d 315 (1954) (definition
of "use" not found in adopted section).
' E.g., Pasfield v. Donovan, 7 Ill.2d 563, 131 N.E.2d 504 (1956) ; People v. Lewis, 5
IU.2d 117, 125 N.E.2d 87 (1955); Co-ordinated Transport v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321, 106
N.E.2d 510 (1952); City of Evanston v. Wazau, 364 Ill. 198, 4 N.E.2d 79 (1936).
'E.g., Michaels v. Hill, 328 Ill. 11, 159 N.E. 278 (1927) (Amendatory Act could not
expand act concerning county taxes to include municipal debt provisions). Compare Don-
nensberger v. Prendergast, 128 Ill. 229, 21 N.E. 1 (1889) (Township Act could not include
incorporated villages).
' People ex rel. Brenza v. Gebbie, 5 ll.2d 565, 126 N.E.2d 657 (1955).
"'People v. City of Chicago, 414 IM. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953).
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more inclined to find only a single subject. And, of course, the scope of the
amended act could be increased by suitably amending the title.7'
Subject-title doctrines have been used in several recent decisions to elimi-
nate, at least partially, the need for even expressly amendatory acts to comply
with the constitutional republishing requirement. Where the title of an ex-
pressly amendatory act purports to amend only specific sections of the amend-
ed act, but in fact changes additional sections thereof, the unannounced
amendment has been upheld on two interrelated grounds. It is reasoned first
that since the title of the old act is fully repeated, anything germane to the
amended act may be included in the new amending act. Secondly, those
changes not identified by the title of the new act are upheld despite non-
compliance with the reprinting provision if they are "complete in themselves."
Thus, an expressly amendatory statute is treated in part as if it were amend-
atory by implication only. Since one must read the old act to determine
whether this has been done, the efficacy of even expressly amendatory titles
is greatly reduced.72
A final comment upon the problem of general revisions or codifications
should be made. A general revision or codification is generally said to repeal
by implication all provisions of existing acts on the same subject which are
omitted from the revision or compilation, even though there is no repugnance
or express repealing clause.73 A'true "revision," then, is not an "amendment"
to which the constitution applies. 4 This result, however, depends upon evi-
dence of a legislative intent to cover the whole subject and to frame a new
legislative "scheme." Such an intent is clear, for example, where both the old
act and the new revision are identically headed or where the new act exhaus-
tively covers the subject.75 But the label of "revision or codification" will not
protect an attempt to revive a previously repealed act.7 6
I See ibid.; Department of Pub. Wks., etc. v. Chicago T. & T. Co., 408 Ill. 41, 95 N.E.2d
903 (1950) (increasing scope of department authority over state parks).
"'E.g., Sangamon County Fair, etc. v. Standard, 9 Ill.2d 267, 137 N.E.2d 487 (1956);
People ex rel. Bentson v. Bowen, 9 IlI.2d 69, 136 N.E.2d 806 (1956); Co-ordinated Trans-
port v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321, 106 N.E.2d 510 (1952) ; Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52
N.E.2d 229 (1944).
See, e.g., People v. Horwitz, 362 Ill. 289, 199 N.E. 788 (1936) (General Assembly was
in the act of revising all the criminal laws); People v. Borgeson, 335 Ill. 136, 166 N.E.
451 (1929) (both old and new acts entitled "Deadly Weapons" showed legislative intent
to repeal old acts).
' This is also true in about nineteen other states which have similar prohibitions against
amendment by reference to title only. I Sutherland, op. cit. supra note 3.
' For example where public utilities were completely regulated as in Illinois Central R.
Co. v. Illinois Commerce Com'n., 397 Ill. 387, 74 N.E.2d 526 (1947); Northern Trust v.
Chicago Rys. Co., 318 Ill. 402, 149 N.E. 422 (1925); or comprehensive legislation con-
cerning the administration of estates and probate of wills as in Brooking v. Brooking,
391 Ill. 440, 63 N.E.2d 476 (1945).
" City of Chicago v. lovino, 400 MI1. 354, 81 N.E.2d 171 (1948) (a repealed ordinance
could not validly be re-enacted merely by reprinting in official revision and compilation).
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In sum, it appears that the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted a liberal atti-
tude in applying the subject-title and amendatory requirements of the consti-
tution. Little, if anything, seems to be left of the requirement that amended
provisions must be reprinted at length in the amending act even where the
new act is expressly amendatory. The impossibility of reprinting all acts in
any way affected by the new legislation, and increased use of convenient
annotated compilations have led the Court to inquire whether the questioned
provision is sufficiently "complete in itself" that no other act need be consulted
to determine the law on that part of the subject. It is here that an attack upon
a statute expressly or impliedly amendatory is most likely to succeed. 77 Thus,
the declining effectiveness of the amendment provision has placed the burden
of procedural safeguard upon the subject-title requirement.
By way of anticipation, one might speculate upon section 770 of the new Illinois
Savings and Loan Act. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §770.
This act is titled "An Act to revise and codify the laws in relation to Savings and Loan
Associations and to provide penalties for the violation thereof and to repeal an Act therein
named." Section 770 deals with joint accounts, trust accounts, and payment-on-death
accounts. It contains for the first time provisions which might well be construed to "amend"
the Probate Act insofar as it purports to allow a testamentary disposition of the account
funds without complying with the formalities required for the execution of wills. Consult,
for example, the discussion to that effect in Bank Accounts: Transfer of Property at Death,
23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 289, 296-97, 301-8 (1956).
Assuming that the provision is so construed, what is the likelihood of successful attack
on Art. IV, §13 grounds? Briefly the provision could be upheld on the following grounds: 1)
The act is a clear attempt at general revision and codification and as such is not subject to
"amendatory" prohibitions; 2) The act is complete in itself-there is no need to refer to
the Probate Act with respect to testamentary dispositions of such trust accounts; and 3)
The act relates to the single general subject of Savings and Loan Associations to which
the effects on their trusts accounts is "germane." On the other hand, it can be argued
against the provision that: The provision creates an ambiguity with respect to testamen-
tary dispositions which may have been unexpected and unintended by the parties despite
the signing of a signature card agreement. See Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill.2d 180, 127 N.E.2d
445 (1955), and consult 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 289 (1956). Furthermore this is an extraordi-
nary departure from established custom and usage which should have been indicated in the
title. The policies with respect to the probate of wills and administration of estates designed
to protect creditors of the estate are firmly established.
THE UNION RIGHT TO REQUIRE EMPLOYER MEMBERSHIP
A recurrent problem of labor law has been the legality of union attempts to
extend control over employers beyond the traditional sphere of wages, working
conditions and employee membership. The Barbers Union, attempted such an
extension of control by three successive amendments2 to its constitution requir-
'The full title of the union is Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers, Cosmetologists and
Proprietors International Union of America, A.F. of L. Prior to the amendments requiring
employer membership, the union went under the title of Journeymen Barbers, Hairdressers,
and Cosmetologists' International Union of America.
2The first amendment provided that the employer must be a nonactive member who
was not entitled to vote or to a seat in union meetings or to hold any office or to serve
19571 COMMENTS
